LTHOUGH TEILHARD de Chardin's intention in his scientific works is L decidedly not metaphysical, the metaphysical implications of his evolutionary cosmology are numerous. It seems important to extract these elements and render them explicit. Such an explication promises to offer further clarification of the Teilhardian synthesis, to open new areas of exploration for both philosophers and scientists, and to extricate the covert philosophical complexities subtly woven into his phenomenology.
Teilhard's ontogenesis finds logical expression in his concept of psychogenesis as it becomes observable in the biological law of increasing centro-complexity consciousness. As subatomic particles complexify to become the primary building blocks of life, psychic energy centrifies and leads nonreflective life to thought. Teilhard explains and maintains that the evolutionary story of the cosmos is the unfolding history of the genesis of mind: cosmogenesis becoming anthropogenesis resulting in psychogenesis. His evolutionary phenomenology traces the gradual increase of consciousness as it emerges in proportion to increasing biological and physical complexity.
Incipient consciousness exists from time's beginning and emerges gradually as both the driving force and ultimate goal of evolution. 9 It is the energy of divine consciousness which conceives, impels, and continues the creation of the cosmos. "Universal energy," he insists, "must be a thinking energy." 10 For Teilhard, God is more than ipsum esse subsistens. God is supreme, centered intelligence. Divine psychic energy is primordial in the cosmos and human psychic energy is the greatest testimony to this as the primary reality.
Metaphysics of "Unire" vs. Metaphysics of "Esse"
In a 1948 essay, "Comment je vois," Teilhard dares to tender a novel metaphysics of union. The priest/scientist maintains that God exists by uniting himself. Whereas classical metaphysics begins with the primordiality of being, Teilhardian metaphysics rests upon the primordiality of union. 11 Being is a consequence of union; union constitutes being. To be is to be united. Using a concept drawn from physics, 7 Ibid. 204; TF 189. 8 Ibid. Teilhard maintains that just as it is impossible to separate a moving body from its act of motion, so in a metaphysics of unire the act of union cannot be separated from the fact of being. 12 According to Teilhard, being cannot be defined in isolation, but only in relationship to that which is constitutive to its reality. Being, therefore, can only be understood in conjunction with its act of unification. As motion constitutes the reality of the moving body, union constitutes the reality of being.
The concept of union, the act of unification, immediately implies energy, movement, dynamism, activity. God is an infinite center of dynamic energy. Ipsum esse, in Thomistic understanding, is being itself. God is his own act of existence. Simply, God is be-ing-God is.
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What is intrinsic to God's act of existence, to God's be-ing? Teilhard conjectures it is that God unites. First, God unites himself and then God unites the multiple to himself through a gradual incorporation of smaller units of complexity into larger units of increasingly centered complexity which reflect higher and higher degrees of psychic energy or consciousness.
Teilhard suggests that being and union be considered as "forming a natural pair, the two terms of which, while each equally primordial and fundamentally irreducible, are nevertheless ontologically inseparable (like the two surfaces of one and the same plane) and constrained to vary simultaneously in the same direction." 14 In an example Teilhard draws from physics, it becomes obvious that he considers union or the act of unifying as prior to and requisite for being. "And by analogy with what happens in physics, where, as we now know, acceleration creates mass: which means that the moving object is posterior to motion." 15 Teilhard is not suggesting, then, that being is united from some preexisting "matter." Rather, it seems, in terms of his entire system of thought, that he considers union to be prerequisite to being-just as trinitization precedes the posited existence of a "creatable nil" which exists at the pole opposite from it. 16 le "Nevertheless, on two later occasions, he attempted to preserve his 'metaphysics of union* by seeking, not to reduce esse to unire or uniri, or to identify the two notions, but of unire seems, in fact, to safeguard the definition of God as "Pure Act," for the pure act, which is unification, precedes and engenders "potency" for being which results, as a consequence of the Ture Act," in finite being. The multiple, matter (or perhaps more philosophically correct, essence) in a state of total disunity and non-being cannot exist unless the act of unification brings it into being.
17
It is on this basis that Teilhard suggests a movement away from the metaphysics of esse to one of unire. 18 are no "key texts" which explicitly define his use of analogy. 22 In order to extricate the theory, one must extrapolate the meanings which are implied and/or discussed in each of the texts in which analogy is used.
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In Teilhard's day such an analysis had not yet been accomplished. Therefore, he understands Aquinas's ontology only in terms of the analogy of proper proportionality, which is the reason he finds the Thomistic analogy of being unsatisfactory. To compensate for the limitations of Thomistic metaphysics, Teilhard chooses those scientific analogies which for him best express the relationship between God and the world. 24 To think in the manner of the physicist is to focus on the similarities, not the differences, between the terms of each pair. Thus scientific analogies become the models which Teilhard uses to define ens a se and participated being in terms of their similarities rather than their differences.
AQUINAS: METAPHYSICS OF "ESSE"
The modern understanding of Thomistic metaphysics may help to clarify the questions raised by Teilhard in his attempts to define the relationship between God and the world. In his doctrine of participating being, Thomas draws a distinction between essence and existence. While God is the cause of his own existence, since his essence is his act of existence, in created beings essence and the act of existence are distinct. "That a thing is," its existence, differs from "what a thing is," its essence. 25 Essence is the potentiality to be in act or the potency to receive one's act of existence. Whereas God is pure act, creatures are a mixture of potency and act. Created beings receive their existence from God and are not the source of their own act of being.
Therefore we have to assert that being is predicated essentially only of God, inasmuch as the divine existence (esse) is an existence (esse) that is subsistent and absolute. But being is predicated of every creature by participation, since no creature is its own existence (esse) but is something having existence (esse) being is participated in as something not belonging to the thing's essence.
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George Klubertanz lucidly explains that, in the analogy of proportionality, "there is no direct relationship between the analogates themselves; there is instead a relationship within each of the analogates, 
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The doctrine of participating being is best explained by a combination of the analogy of proper proportionality and the analogy of intrinsic attribution. In this latter analogy, "the analogon is principally or perfectly in one analogate, called the primary analogate, and only secondarily (by relation) in the other or secondary analogate."
28 Being and the other transcendental perfections are rooted in God's act of existence. They are perfections which God possesses by the very nature of the existence which is his. 29 Creatures share in these perfections proportionally and intrinsically as the effect images its cause.
Klubertanz indicates that Thomas frequently employs cause and effect in an effort to demonstrate the similarity between God and creatures. 30 Aquinas maintains that the analogy of proportionality must be understood as expressing a "relationship of order" between the two terms discussed:
There is a proportion between the creature and God as an effect to its cause and as a knower to an object known. However, because the Creator infinitely exceeds the creatures, the creature is not so proportioned to its Creator that it receives His causal influence in its perfection, nor that it knows Him perfectly. Causal participation coincides with exemplar causality which in turn is linked with efficient and telic causality. The creature is similar to God, an imperfect representation of the perfect image which it reflects and resembles as the effect mirrors cause. Klubertanz explains that "whereas an image is that which imitates an exemplar, an exemplar is that which is imitated. An idea is an exemplar form existing in the intellect of the efficient cause which produces the image." 33 "It is clear," Aquinas explains, "that an effect preexists in an efficient cause." 34 The effect carries within it a likeness to that which produced it and resembles the end to which it is ordered by its creation. 35 An understanding of Thomas's use of exemplar and efficient causality leads to the assertion that the likeness between the creature and God is intrinsic, not extrinsic. "[E]ach being," according to Aquinas, "is called good because of a likeness of the divine goodness inhering in it, which is formally the goodness by which it is denominated."
36
Thus an understanding of cause/effect, exemplar, efficient, and telic causality leads to the definition and/or understanding of the doctrine of participating being described earlier in this section.
God, the first efficient and exemplar cause of all creatures and their ultimate goal, possesses being, goodness, and similar perfections by His very essence, in a most perfect manner, as identical with that essence and with each other; creatures, the effects of God's causality, participate or share in an imperfect manner in such analogous perfections, and so that these perfections are distinct from each other, because they are received in the creatures' potencies. 
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idea of the Divine which exists in the mind. 38 It is not surprising, therefore, that Eckhart's ontological analyses begin, not with the physical world perceptible to the senses, but with God, as Frank Tobin and Reiner Schürmann aptly note. Furthermore, Eckhart takes one of Aquinas' prime doctrines, God is ipsum esse, and reverses the proposition to maintain that Esse est Deus. Eckhart uses this inversion to demonstrate that the primary reality about God is that God exists with an existence not owed to any external cause or being. In God, existence is prior to all else and is the necessary element in all being.
It is not the nature of existence itself to be in something or from something or through something; neither is it added or joined to anything. On the contrary, it precedes and comes before everything. So the existence of everything is immediately from the first and universal cause of all things. All things exist from existence itself, and through it and in it, while existence is not in something or from something; for what is different from existence is not or is nothing. Existence itself is related to everything as its actuality and perfection; it is that actuality of all things, even of forms.
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Eckhart's understanding of esse as it applies to God and creatures departs dramatically from Thomas' perception ofthat reality. Aquinas maintains, true to the analogy of attribution, that only God is esse in its fullest and purest sense; the creature's esse, which is created from nothing, is a participated sharing in the perfection of God's being. Although the creature possesses a real existence which is separate from the existence of God and proper to the creature in itself, it nevertheless remains dependent upon God.
Armand Maurer explains that Eckhart apprehends the relationship between "created" and uncreated esse in quite a different manner. For Eckhart, "Absolute existence is God as he is in himself, transcending creatures; formally inherent existence is the same existence as it is immanent in creatures, penetrating and touching them, so to speak, in order to make them exist." 40 Following Albert the Great's model, Eckhart understands existence as informing the creature in the same way that the soul informs the body. As the life principle, the soul vitalizes the entire corporeal structure in each of its related parts. The soul and body comprise one whole, such that the latter cannot exist without the former. The supreme and pure Existence who is God penetrates all reality with his presence and, without an intermediary, enlivens and At the time Eckhart was writing, it was believed that the analogy of proper proportionality was the sole analogy used by Aquinas to explain the relationship between God and creatures. Believing this to be inadequate, as Teilhard would five centuries later, Eckhart moved away from Thomas's analogy of proper proportionality to the analogy of attribution. 42 According to Eckhart, the creature receives its being on loan and, in its own right, possesses nothing at all. "Its act of existence is not its own, but from another and in another to whom is 'all honor and glory* because it is his."
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Using an analogy proposed by Dionysius and adopted by Aquinas as well, 44 Eckhart explains that a creature receives its being in a manner analogous to the way in which the air receives light. The sun illumines the air without resting there in a permanent manner. When the sun sets, the light is extinguished. It is in this manner that God diffuses existence to creatures. 45 Or again, creatures receive existence as an image takes its life from the person whose reflection it is. The image vanishes as soon as the person steps away from the medium of reflection. 46 Thus the creature exists more truly in God than in itself and in fact has no existence at all outside of him.
Creatures exist within existence, that is to say within God and through the divine existence.... Indeed, apart from God, or outside of him, creatures are absolutely nothing God, as existence itself, is immediately present to creatures, and they exist through him and in him alone. But this does not imply that they possess an existence of their own, different from that of God; for God 41 Together with Aristotle and Thomas, Eckhart affirms that the first term of the analogy possesses being by priority, per prius, the second per posterius. Eckhart follows his predecessors insofar as this difference of modes opens the realm to which analogy is applied. But "mode" ... does not mean the same thing in Eckhart and in his predecessors. Aristotle and Thomas think of a secondary mode of being, that is, one of diminished intensity, whereas Eckhart has in mind subsequent attributions of the sole being which is God.
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Schürmann explains well the key difference between Thomas and Eckhart. "In his view attribution no longer falls within the realistic context of an analogy of proportionality. Attribution does not refer to a mode of being, but to a mode or presence ofthat single being which is God." 49 Apart from God, creatures, according to Eckhart, are nothing. Because creatures and God can share nothing univocally, if God is being, then creatures must be nonbeing. What they receive they have on loan. They have nothing which is properly theirs. The analogy proposed by Eckhart is extrinsic.
50 'Thus esse is only properly in the esse absolutum, which is God. The esse formaliter inherens is not really esse and has no real basis within itself for being similar to esse absolutum. It is at best a sign of esse, as the wreath hung outside the tavern is a sign of the wine within." ST 1, q. 8, a. 1 fleetingness of borrowed being," which differentiates it from God's being.
62
By blending the analogies of proportionality and attribution, Aquinas defines a being which is proper to both God and creatures and yet different. The being which is God's is uncreated and identical with God's essence, while the being of creatures is created and is an act which can only be received by a potency; therefore, a creature's essence and existence are different. 53 In the Opus tripartitum, Eckhart refuses even an analogical similarity of proportionality between the being of God and that of creatures and emphasizes an analogy of extrinsic attribution which places the creatures in a position of total dependency on God.
It must be reiterated that Eckhart apparently did not grasp the Thomistic blend of the analogies of proportionality and attribution. stands by this act of unification as it occurs within the Godhead and in creation. For Teilhard, the act of unification in the immanent Trinity and in creation are different. Whereas God is his own act of unification, an act, by definition, necessary and intrinsic to a being who exists within and of itself, the creature is acted upon in order to be unified. Being and union are ontologically necessary 'to being" both in terms of eternal and temporal beings. Although, Teilhard chooses to speak in terms of unire rather than esse, the explanation parallels classical, traditional, Thomistic metaphysics and is not simply a departure from it. God is his own act of unification, the creature is brought into being by an act of unification of the Creator. As mentioned above, Teilhard contends that being and union should be understood "as forming a natural pair, the two terms of which, while equally primordial and fundamentally irreducible, are nevertheless ontologically inseparable-like the two surfaces of one and the same plane." 54 He indicates that the use of paired entities in physics (such as mass-velocity or electricity-magnetism) or in psychology (such as understanding-love) "could assist the metaphysician in a discussion and understanding of Absolute and participated being."
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In physics the first terms of the pairs (velocity, electricity, motion) exist interdependently with the second terms of the pair (mass, magnetism, moving body). The first and second terms do not exist independently from each other, but are, in fact, coterminus. How does one separate motion from the moving body? Clearly, in these carefully chosen examples, the first and second terms of the pairs cannot be discussed or analyzed discretely but must be considered in relationship to one other.
The most recent investigations of the physicists have shown that the "commonsense" evidence which underlies the whole of the philosophia perennis is misleading: motion is not independent of the moving body-on the contrary, the moving body is physically engendered [or more precisely, co-engendered (ou plus exactement co-engendré)]-by the motion which animates it.
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It appears that the interdependent relationship which Teilhard suggests here coincides neither with the Thomistic intrinsic analogy of attribution, nor the Eckhartian extrinsic analogy of attribution.
The context of the above discussion, whose importance cannot be 64 Bonaventure, like Teilhard, interprets God's fecundity on two levels: first, in the generation of the immanent Trinity, second in the creation of the world. In order to diffuse himself to the highest degree, God must communicate his goodness to one capable of sustaining the full implications of the self-diffusion. The only possible reciprocal relationship must be between himself and another Being equal to him in all respects. "We are to hold that He supremely communicates Himself by eternally possessing One who is beloved and One Who is Mutual Love, so that He is both one and triune." 63 In true Greek fashion, Bonaventure understands the Father as the fountain fullness, fontalis pienitudo, the fecund source of the divinity who, without diminishment to his nature, pours forth others consubstantial and equal to himself in all things. The Father is unbegotten and it is precisely his innascibilitas which interfaces with his fecundity in the generation of the Trinity. 64 Crucial to a correct interpretation of Bonaventure's thought is an understanding of the centrality in his system of the coincidence of opposites. According to Ewert Cousins, the poised juxtaposition between innascibility and fecundity provides the foundational basis for Bonaventure's consistent utilization of this dialectic. The dynamic structure of the Trinitarian operations ad intra and ad extra, the basis for the Bonaventurian doctrine of creation, flow from this primal coincidence.
The constitution of the Trinity illustrates the dynamism of coincidence in the Father's generation of the Son and spiration of the Spirit. The Son is the perfect likeness of the Father, the medium within the Trinity and between the Trinity and creation. As begotten, the Son is the polar opposite of the Father who is unbegotten. The Holy Spirit is the Gift who "is given through the will," 65 the bond of love and the principle of union. The Spirit is neither unbegotten nor begotten but breathed forth in union by the Father and the Son. Therefore the generation of the Trinity establishes yet another coincidence of opposites. As wholly receptive, the Holy Spirit does not produce and so is in direct opposition to the Father who produces. Between these two is the Son, who is both produced and produces and so active and receptive simultaneously.
66 Thus Bonaventure perceives within the Godhead the perfect coincidence of opposites.
God could not share the fullness of his goodness with the world, for created reality must differ in nature, substance, and being from the divine. "For the diffusion in time in creation is no more than a center or point in relation to the immensity of the divine goodness." 67 Equality and mutuality of relationship can only occur among equals each of whom is capable of a participative, reciprocal, dynamic exchange. Such an interchange is shared among the members of the Trinity.
This same self-diffusive goodness is the raison d'être for creation. Because God's goodness first expresses itself in the constitution of the inner trinitarian life, creation is neither the primary manifestation of his goodness, nor the sole manner through which his goodness diffuses itself. 68 The self-diffusion of the good in the Trinity guarantees the independence of God from his creation, hence his undiminished transcendence, and allows him to be immanent in creation.
According to Bonaventure, God is dipolar independently of the world; for in the innascibility of the Father there is both a self-sufficient and a selfcommunicating pole. It is true that the self-communicating pole is the ground of his communication in the world; but even with the world, God's selfcommunicating pole is actualized in an absolute way in the Father's generation of the Son and the spiration of the Spirit.
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Thus the self-diffusion wears two faces, one of singularity in plurality (One God in Three Person), the other of plurality in singularity (Three Persons who are One God). 65 While Teilhard believes with Bonaventure that it is the trinitarian structure of the Godhead which allows God to remain transcendent to creation, he also maintains that trinitization produces a diametrical opposition cui extra. This opposition is the antithesis of unity; it is the pure multiple, absolute nothingness, complete disunity. Relying upon the concept of the coincidence of opposi tes evidenced in Bonaventurian trinitarian theology, it becomes possible to explain from a classical vantage point this seemingly novel hypothesis of Teilhard's.
According to both Bonaventure and Teilhard, in the Godhead is a fullness which expresses itself in a perfect opposition among persons which results in absolute, independent, and self-sufficient unity. Im manent trinitarian self-expression is thus perfectly realized in the mu tual and maximum opposition among the three Persons. The only op position remaining is extrinsic to the triunity; it is that which, in itself, unlike the divinity, is incapable of coming to unity. That which is every thing (God) contrasts starkly with that which is no thing (pure multiple); that which is perfectly united points to that which is abso lutely diffuse. 70 The "creatable nil" which Teilhard posits, is at the "very opposite pole from [God] (phase three)." 71 The only opposition remaining after trinitization is that which is not God, that which is outside of God, a concept not only intelligible, but logical, in light of the coincidence of opposites. Thus there is the juxtaposition of the uncreated and the creatable-a coincidence of opposites which will be realized perfectly in the person of Christ in whom the uncreated and the created coincide.
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Juxtaposed to God's trinitarian fullness is a nothingness which is the ''passive potentiality of arrangement (that is to say, of union)." Rahner, "When God wants to be what is not God, the world [man] comes to be." 75 
Critique of Classical Metaphysics
Phase 4 concerns itself with Creation. In this regard, classical metaphysics is critiqued by Teilhard, first, because it attributes creation to God through an act of efficient causality; 76 second, because it compromises the relationship between creature and Creator; 77 third, because it offers no adequate explanation of evil. The first two objections are related.
In a world of participated being produced by an act of efficient causality, classical ontology is logically obliged to define the created world as completely contingent, the object of pure mercy: as such, whether we look at it from the point of view of modern man, or from the Christian point of view, the world is in both cases found to be unsatisfying What does "being beatified" matter if, when all is said and done, our lives make no "absolute" contribution to the totality of being.
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To insure the transcendent, self-sufficiency of God, Teilhard believes classical metaphysics invented the notion of a participated or secondary being, created ex nihilo. "In the metaphysics of Esse, pure act, once posited, monopolizes all that is absolute and necessary in being; and, no matter what one does, nothing can then justify the existence of participated being." 79 Creatures are "an entirely gratuitous supplement or addition: the guests at the divine banquet."
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Classical metaphysics and the thought of Thomas Aquinas as it was taught to Teilhard deny the presence of any need in God. 81 The Absolute Being is complete and self-sufficient and neither creation nor the creature, even the finite rational being, can add to the fullness and totality of the Divinity. Aquinas lucidly explains that the "divine goodness neither depends on the perfection of the universe nor is anything added to it from this perfection." 82 In addition, Bonaventura asserts unequivocally, "It (Being) is unchangeable precisely because it is most actual. For because it is most actual, it is pure act; and what is pure act can acquire nothing new, can lose nothing it already has; hence it cannot be changed." 83 To maintain in any way that creatures complete or fulfill God implies change, and to impute change is, in turn, to postulate a real relation between God and creatures, which is a position unacceptable to both Aquinas and Bonaventura. 84 Third, the universe of classical metaphysics offers no satisfactory solution to the problem of evil. In the old worldview, it is impossible to give an adequate, logical explanation for a good, omnipotent, loving God's creation of a world full of evil. 85 In the metaphysics of union, although God remains self-sufficient, independent, free, and still on an ontologically different plane from the created, the human being as well as all creation enters into a qualitatively different form of relationship to God. 86 The shift is from an ontological emphasis on the primacy of being to an ontogenic focus on the primacy of becoming which renders both process and product coherent. 
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Teilhard deduces from this hypothesis that God, in some way, fulfills or adds to himself through the process of creation by further acts of unification through which the "creatable nil" is drawn into increasingly more complex forms of being which result in higher forms of consciousness. "God fulfills himself, he in some way completes himself, in the pleroma." 89 Teilhard insists that there exists a genuine "complementarity" between God and the world, a "complementarity" which Aristotelian and classical metaphysics fail to grasp. [W]e shall find that for them the existence of the world is accepted from the outset... as an inevitable fact, or in any case as an accomplished fact. In both of them, on the other hand, what a sense we find of the absolute value of a cosmic drama in which God would indeed appear to have been ontologically involved even before his incarnation.
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What Teilhard finds each to emphasize, and his own words carry the uncompromised meaning he wishes to convey, is the "sense of mutual completion of the world and God which gives life to Christianity." 92 It is not the complete dependence of the world upon God as held by John and Paul, but the "complementarity" the one assumes in the face of the other. Such a focus neither minimizes nor diminishes the transcendence and self-sufficiency of God, but does place a necessary value on creation which invites the human being to enter into a consequential relationship with the world and with God. Human effort contributes to the divine work; the divine work is enhanced by human effort. Teilhard presents a God who, because of his self-sufficiency and love, understands that to love is to be enriched by or to need the beloved.
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The dichotomy between the world of classical metaphysics and that of Teilhard de Chardin arises because of the widespread acceptance of evolution in the 19th century. A static, immobile world, a world in which Genesis is translated and interpreted literally, is one in which efficient causality, with all of the ramifications contingent to it, works and serves well. On the other hand, in a world in process, a world in evolution, a world in motion, in which Genesis is interpreted in terms of an ongoing, dynamic, continuously unfolding process, efficient causality, with all of its attendant consequences, is no longer adequate. The model no longer works well. In a multitude of ways, Teilhard repeatedly endeavors to speak this unheard message.
It is this same worldview which Teilhard affirms when he states, "If participated being is to act effectively, it must (though we still have to pletion and fulfillment. Nevertheless, as the editor indicates, Teilhard did not alter hie thinking and continued to hold that the cosmos is "much more than a satisfying product" (ibid. 65 n; HM 78-79 n. find a formula to express this) possess, in its own way, something that is absolute and non-contingent in its formation." 94 The editor notes that such noncontingency might be defined as each person's final in corporation into the mystical body of Christ, into a shared participa tion in Christ's divinity. Seen in this way, the concept takes on a much more traditional character. 95 Elsewhere, Teilhard understands this element of noncontingency or completion of the Divinity as a contri bution to increased unity within the Godhead in the pleroma, which is simply another way of expressing in a more oblique manner the truth indicated earlier in this paragraph. As humankind coalesces in a state of coreflective unity, as the whole of the human race undergoes incor poration into Christ, that which was once separate from God in a condition of unresolved disunity becomes one with God in the unified mystical body of Christ.
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Teilhard decries a metaphysics which continues to separate that which belongs together as an indissoluble pair: God and the world. Taking his cue from new models in physics, Teilhard points out that distinctions previously held sacrosanct are being negated. Current sci entific models indicate that apparent antimonies are linked and not as radically different and independent from one another as once thought. Teilhard conjectures that modern physicists, who understand freshly the relationships between such things as mass and velocity, electricity and magnetism, are leading humankind to a new assessment of the relationship between Absolute and participated being.
What I have in mind here is a synthetic re-definition of being, which, taken in its most general form, would include, both simultaneously, an absolute term and a participated term. What makes the God-world antimony insoluble is that we first split up a natural pair and then persist in considering the two terms in succession.
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This idea of God and the world being a "natural pair" seems to flow from the Teilhardian hypothesis that trinitization establishes a "creatable nil" in opposition to the Uncreated Unity, hence, the potential (better considered as an active possibility) for the world exists in the very act of God's own immanent unification. According to Teilhard, the optimal way to understand God and the world is to perceive God as different from the world in nature but personally linked to it in a relationship of mutual complementarity. ticipated being. Instead of explaining participated being in terms of its differentiation from nonbeing, he defines it by its ability to be in "positive relation to God," by "its power of entering into oemmunion" with God.
98 This is quite unlike Meister Eckhart, who refuses to see any positive relationship between the Being of God and human being and maintains that if God is Being the creature is non-being.
Both the created and the uncreated, writes Teilhard, need to be defined first as existing in themselves and then as existing in relationship to each other. In classical terminology, one finds the analogy of proportionality combined with the intrinsic analogy of attribution; the first safeguards God's transcendence, the second God's immanence. Both created and uncreated Reality experience internal or immanent union (the created in coming to both self-reflective and coreflexive consciousness, the uncreated in trinitization) and both experience union with the absolutely other (the creature with the Creator and vice versa).
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Only in a fixed and static concept of the world does God create "isolated beings" "instantaneously," thus establishing the myth that creation and creatures emerged intact from the hand of God. In a world in evolution the reality presents quite a different face. Teilhard explains that the purpose of creation is to generate a universe. When one investigates the process from within, it becomes apparent that "creation can be effected only by an evolutive process (of personalizing synthesis); and that it can come into action only once: when 'absolute' multiple (which is produced in antithesis to trinitarian unity) is reduced, nothing is left to be united either in God or 'outside' God." 100 According to Teilhard, in an evolutionary universe the insoluble problem of evil finds a solution. A world in process is necessarily incomplete. It is logical that in the ongoing work of unification there will inevitably be waste. Teilhard understands evil as a by-product of evolutive maturation. "So we find physical discords or decompositions in the pre-living; suffering in the living; sin in the domain of freedom. There can be no order in process of formation which does not at every stage imply some disorder."
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If, as Teilhard conjectures, creation is the unification of the multiple, then three consequences emerge. First, creation can be accomplished only once when the absolute multiple has the potential to be drawn to unity. Once the multiple has been "reduced" to the one, no further
